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PART I INTRODUCTION
The burgeoning gig economy largely operates outside of existing labour standards,
mainly because in most countries workers are classified as self-employed rather than
as employees. Until now, much legal effort has been focused on bringing platform
workers within the scope of labour law by proving that they fit the definition of
employee or worker, which functions as the gateway to employment rights. This has
yielded some positive outcomes, particularly in exposing sham self-employment.
However, this approach is limited, not least because platforms are adept at reconfiguring
their conditions of work to avoid the legal definition of employee, or at fragmenting their
corporate structure to evade the jurisdiction of courts in the region where workers in fact
find themselves. By contrast, not enough attention has been paid to how labour law stan-
dards, fashioned for the ‘employee’ paradigm, should be reshaped to meet the needs of
platform workers regardless of their employment status.
It is these challenges that the Fairwork project in South Africa aims to address. It
brings together social scientists and lawyers to establish novel means of developing
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appropriate labour standards as well as to test alternative means of compliance, using
both reputational means and legal change. Funded by the ESRC Global Challenges
Research Fund, the project has created a ranking scheme to evaluate the working con-
ditions of digital platform workers. Drawing inspiration from the Fairtrade and Living
Wage campaigns, it aims to create pressure on platforms to improve working conditions
through a public ranking system which scores selected platforms according to their
record under five broad principles: fair pay, fair conditions, fair contract, fair manage-
ment and fair representation. Such scores, as well as appealing to the reputational con-
cerns of platforms, can be used by workers to negotiate for better working conditions,
and by consumers. Concurrently, we aim to use the empirical work to develop standards
capable of being given legally binding force.
This paper addresses a key issue arising from the project. Given that the limited
impact of legal regulation has prompted action to be taken outside of labour law in
this area, what, if any, is the ongoing role of labour law? It will be shown that there is
an important two-way interaction between rating standards and legal regulation. Only
through ensuring that this interaction remains and grows, will both labour law and
rating principles be capable, ultimately, of advancing decent work for platform
workers. Part II examines pathways to change, setting out the project and its overall
rationales. Part III examines the substance of the rating principles and their interaction
with legal employment rights. Part IV touches on how rating principles might be trans-
lated into legally binding standards capable of responding to the needs of platform
workers. It concludes that they should be seen as crucially complementary.
PART II PATHWAYS TO CHANGE
By platform work, we mean work which is organized and mediated by digital labour
platforms such as Uber.1 It is common for platforms to classify workers as self-employed
and therefore outside of any labour law protections. Litigation contesting this classifi-
cation has had mixed results, usually depending on how the court construes the
extent to which the platform has control over its workers.2 This leaves open multiple
1 N Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (Polity Press 2017), 43. Our research focuses on geographically-tethered
platform work rather than cloudwork.
2 An employment relationship was found in Douglas O’Connor v Uber Technologies, No. C-13-3826 EMC,
March 11, 2015 (Northern District of California); Dynamex v The Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Ct.App. 2/7 B249546 (The Supreme Court of California). See also cases from Cour de Cassation (French
Supreme Court), November 28, 2018 https://www.soulier-avocats.com/en/reclassification-of-the-
contract-between-a-delivery-rider-and-a-digital-platform-a-strong-message-sent-by-the-cour-de-
cassation/; Sao Paulo Appellate Court, August 28, 2018 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/
business/2018/08/uber-drivers-are-employees-court-decides-in-brazil.shtml; Valencia Social Affairs
Court, June 2019 https://phys.org/news/2019-06-spanish-court-deliveroo-riders-employees.html;
Madrid Court, July 2019 https://www.france24.com/en/20190723-madrid-court-rules-deliveroo-riders-
are-employees. An iindependent contractor relationship was found in the following cases: Michael
Kaseris v Rasier Pacific, V.O.F., [2017] FWC 6610 (Australian Fair Work Commission); Pallage v
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opportunities for platforms to recast the nature of the relationship to evade these tests,
leaving it up to workers to mount further legal challenges. All the workers in the Fair-
work study were classified by the relevant platforms as self-employed.
The limits of labour law’s ability to fill this regulatory space prompts us to ask
whether there are other ways of achieving decent work for platform workers. Teubner
has famously argued that the ‘command and control’ nature of law triggers the ‘regulat-
ory trilemma’: it either prompts strategies of resistance from the regulated body; or risks
damaging the latter; or brings the law itself into disrepute.3 This is clearly demonstrated
when platforms such as Uber re-characterize their relationships with workers specifically
to avoid attempted legal regulation. This suggests that in addition to command-and-
control, other ways are needed to prompt change in organizations. This is not, of
course, a new insight for labour law, where the ability of law to control capital in
favour of workers has always been regarded with fundamental scepticism.4 The tra-
ditional response is to marginalize command-and-control legal regulation and instead
prioritize autonomous norms arising from collective bargaining between capital and
organized labour. In this way, the power of capital will be counterbalanced with the
power of organized labour. There have been some valiant attempts to organize platform
workers.5 However, because platform work is decentralized and fragmented and workers
are often in competition with each other for work, collective organization is difficult to
achieve.
What other possibilities, then, are there for prompting change within organizations
to achieve decent work for platform workers, including fostering collective organization
and eventually changes in the law? The first step is to move away from the assumption
that compliance can only occur through a ‘classic deterrence’ approach, or ‘a mechanism
of deterrence which works via commands against misconduct spelled out in legal rules,
monitoring of compliance by a state regulatory agency, and application of punitive sanc-
tions for breach’.6 Regulatory studies have shown that this does not properly describe
how successful regulation should operate. Instead of discrete legal measures, studies
have turned to the notion of social control, functioning through a web of influences.7
Rasier, [2018] FWC 2579 (Australian Fair Work Commission); Razak v Uber, CA No. 16-573 (April 11,
2018) (US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania); Lawson v Grubhub, Case No. 15-cv-
05128-JSC (February 8, 2018) (District Court of the Northern District of California); Vega v Postmates,
2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 4610 (June 21, 2018) (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York); Inake v
Deliveroo, 6622665 CV EXPL 18-2673, (July 23, 2018) (Court of First Instance, Amsterdam). A third cat-
egory of worker relationship was found in Uber BV v Aslam [2018] EWCA Civ 2748 and Addison Lee v
Lange [2019] I.C.R. 637 (UK Employment Appeal Tribunal). With thanks to Gautam Bhatia for his
research on this.
3 G Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 239.
4 O Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (2nd edn, Stevens 1977).
5 C Cant, Riding for Deliveroo (Polity Press, 2020); J Woodcock and M Graham, The Gig Economy: A Critical
Introduction (Polity Press 2020); ibid.
6 C Parker and J Braithwaite, ‘Regulation’ in M Tushnet and P Cane (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Legal
Studies (OUP 2005), 129.
7 Ibid 129.
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Most importantly, empirical research has shown that in assessing the disadvantages of
non-compliance, individuals or management do not only consider the direct costs,
such as the size of a possible fine. In addition, they afford great significance to the inde-
terminate costs of bad publicity, and to maintaining or advancing corporate reputation.8
Indeed, studies of organizational behaviour have suggested that informal sanctions,
including negative publicity and public criticism, can have a greater deterrent impact
than formal legal sanctions.9
At the same time, it is clear that there is a need for background legal sanctions, to
bind recalcitrant actors who have little need for reputational uplift, and to reassure
those who do comply that they will not be undercut. Ayers and Braithwaite’s well-
known regulatory pyramid suggests that regulation works best when it begins with
persuasion or cooperative strategies, and escalates up the pyramid to warnings and even-
tually to legal sanctions of increasing levels of intensity.10 Although it has been critiqued
and modified in many ways, this approach remains highly influential and has been
applied by governments and regulators.11
Our project therefore works in two dimensions: we appeal to the influence of repu-
tation, publicity and consumer power,12 while simultaneously shaping appropriate legal
standards and exploring avenues to achieve their adoption. We use a ranking system
rather than a pass-fail certification to reflect the many-facetted nature of decent work
and to create a publicly available record of the standards of work provided by specific
platforms. Comparing platforms’ scores publicly on a league table aims to incentivise
them to improve their ranking.
The challenge is to provide rating scales which can underpin standards of decent
work in this complex domain, while also giving meaningful incentives to platforms to
comply and informing changes in the legal structure. Platforms are scored out of ten
points, based on five principles of fair work: fair wages, fair conditions, fair contracts,
fair management, and fair representation. Each principle is broken down into two
points, one at a more basic level of protection, and the second at a higher level. The
ranking principles have been carefully fashioned, with inputs from labour lawyers,
platform managers, platform workers, government officials and other key
stakeholders.
Evidence for scoring is drawn from three sources. We begin with desk research, to
gain information about the platform, how it operates and the terms and conditions
visible to the public. Secondly, we interview platform managers, asking them to
provide evidence for each point on the ranking system. This also opens up a dialogue
8 Ibid 131.
9 R Paternoster and S Simpson, ‘Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model
of Corporate Crime’ (1996) 30 Law and Society Review 549; J Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Respon-
sive Regulation (OUP 2002), 106.
10 I Ayers and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press 1992), 35.
11 R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2007) LSE Law Society Economy Working Papers.
12 M Graham and others. 2020. The Fairwork Foundation: Strategies for Improving Platform Work in a
Global Context. Geoforum. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2020.01.023
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for the platform to agree changes to better achieve the Fairwork principles. Where plat-
form managers do not agree to interview, scoring is based on the other two sources.
Thirdly, we interview workers, the aim being to interview six to ten workers for each
platform. For the 2020 ranking in South Africa, 74 workers were interviewed across
eleven platforms. These are not representative; instead, they function to confirm or
refute evidence produced by platforms. For example, worker interviews showing that
they are paid less than the minimum wage can be used to deduct points, but interviews
showing the opposite could not confirm that all workers on the platform are paid the
minimum wage.13
Platforms are only awarded a point when they can satisfactorily demonstrate
implementation of the Fairwork principles. Failing to achieve a point does not mean
that a platform does not comply, but that it was not able to demonstrate compliance.
Points are not awarded if there are ambiguities or contradictions between what plat-
forms and workers report. Where there is no data, the score is zero.
The goal is to publish yearly rankings. Fieldwork has now been carried out to apply
the second annual rankings to platforms in South Africa and a league table of scores is
publicly available.14 Eleven platforms were scored during the second year. Of these, there
were two ride-hailing platforms (Uber and Bolt), two domestic work platforms
(Domestly and SweepSouth), one digital recruitment platform (NoSweat), one trade
directory platform (GetTOD), one micro-work and mystery shopping platform
(M4Jam) and four delivery platforms (Picup, UberEats, Mr D, and Orderin). Both
annual league tables show platforms scoring across a wide range. In the second year,
the highest-scoring platforms, NoSweat, GetTOD and SweepSouth, achieved 8 out of
10, while the lowest, Mr D, received 0.
After two annual scoring rounds, it is clear that the appeal to reputation has led
some of the platforms to engage further with the project and implement changes. In
our second year of rating, seven out of eleven platforms engaged in an iterative
process with researchers and provided evidence to support their scores. Two com-
panies, GetTOD and NoSweat, wanted to do better in encouraging worker voice
on the platform (the fifth principle), and thus agreed to adopt a worker-facing
policy to facilitate collective representation and bargaining. These platforms have
also gone beyond the minimum wage requirement set in the first principle, to guar-
antee workers a living wage. Other platforms have codified disciplinary and grie-
vance procedures in their terms and conditions, ensuring due process for
workers. Yet others have already indicated their desire to improve their position
on the league table next year, and proactively approached Fairwork for advice on
how to do so.
13 Graham and others, above, n 12.
14 Fairwork. 2020. Fairwork South Africa Ratings 2020: Labour Standards in the Gig Economy. Cape Town,
South Africa; Oxford, UK; Manchester, UK. https://fair.work/wp-content/uploads/sites/97/2020/03/
Fairwork-South-Africa-2020-report.pdf
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PART III DEVELOPING DECENT WORK STANDARDS FOR PLATFORM
WORKERS
As well as examining alternative pathways to change, a key contribution of the project is its
formulation of the standards themselves. The challenges of crafting appropriate standards
of decent work for platform workers are well-known. Labour law standards generally have
a typical ‘employee’ in mind—working full-time, with defined hours in a defined work-
place with other workers and clear lines of management. Platform workers generally
exhibit very different characteristics. Their hours of work are fluid. The workplace (the
car, bicycle or computer) is often owned or hired by the worker rather than the platform.
For domestic workers, it is a different private house each day. Lines of management are
complex and often obscure; and customer reviews play a central role in performance
evaluation. Workers bear almost all the costs of their work, such as the mobile phone,
data services, vehicle, insurance, fuel, supplies, and safety equipment.
Until now, much legal effort has been focused on squeezing platform workers through
the gateway to employment rights by demonstrating that they fit the definition of
‘employee’ or ‘worker’. This wrongly assumes that, once through the gateway, employment
standards can be applied to platform workers in identical forms to those applying to stan-
dard employees. It also leaves out of account the right to decent work of workers who
cannot get through the gateway, or prefer not to be. Fairwork’s formulation of the
rating principles therefore consciously aims to provide standards which are appropriate
for the specific needs and situation of platform workers. This is not, however, done in a
vacuum. Legal standards are the starting point, which,matchedwith the experience of plat-
form workers, produce a changed but recognizable set of standards. Ultimately, the objec-
tive is for these new standards to be read back into existing labour law to ensure decent
work for all, regardless of how they are characterized. This process is elaborated below.
Fair Pay
The starting point is to extend the statutory minimum wage to platform workers irre-
spective of the employment status of the worker. The first point is awarded if the plat-
form pays at least the minimum wage, or there is a policy requiring payment above this
level. We address the specific situation of platform workers by including in the
minimum wage calculation both direct hours and indirect hours, such as travelling to
a task or waiting between tasks.15
The second point is specifically responsive to the fact that platform workers are
largely responsible for their own costs. Gross weekly pay might appear to be above
the minimum wage, but work-related costs can substantially reduce this amount.
15 Uber BV v Aslam [2018] EWCA Civ 2748; S Fredman and D du Toit, ‘One Small Step Towards Decent
Work: Uber v Aslam in the Court of Appeal’ (2019) 48 Industrial Law Journal 260.
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Average pay levels in our second year South African sample were R48 per hour, signifi-
cantly above the minimum wage of R20.76 (£1.06) per hour. However, these dropped to
an average of R21 per hour once work-related costs were taken into account. This was
particularly problematic for delivery drivers: over 75 per cent of those we interviewed
were earning below the minimum wage after costs. Some were in fact losing money
on longer delivery drops as costs exceeded payment.16 Roughly one third of interviewees
were earning less than minimum wage in net terms.17 Thus, to achieve the second point,
a platform must pay the minimum wage plus costs. To establish a threshold, the plat-
form is required to provide an estimate for work-related costs, which are then
checked through interviews with workers.
On the second year’s rating, ten of the eleven platforms were awarded the first point,
the outlier being Mr D.18 However, this should be seen in the light of the shockingly low
rate of hourly statutory minimum pay in South Africa, which is a mere R20.76, or £1.06.
For domestic workers, it is even lower, at R15.57 an hour, or 80 pence.19 Only six plat-
forms were awarded the second point, with Uber, UberEats, Bolt, and Orderin joining
Mr D in being unable to demonstrate compliance.
This led us to reconsider the standard for fair pay. Given the costs burden borne by
platform workers, it no longer made sense to award a point for minimum pay before
costs are deducted. It has therefore been proposed that costs should be included in
the first point, so that only platforms who pay the minimum wage after costs are
awarded this point. For the second point, our proposal is to turn to the concept of a
living wage. This untethers us from existing legal frameworks, necessitating a formula
for a living wage which is feasible and considered legitimate by platforms. As previously
noted, two South African platforms have already adopted living wage policies following
engagement with Fairwork. We have drawn on the conception of a living wage as remu-
neration sufficient for a basic but decent standard of living for a worker and their
family.20 There are several ways to calculate the living wage: putting these sources
together, we have come up with the figure of R6,800 per month for 2020.21 The sugges-
tion is that this should be the standard for the third year.
16 R Heeks and others, (2019) Evaluating PlatformWork Against DecentWork Standards: Evidence from the
South Africa Fairwork Project, paper presented at Post-Automation symposium, University of Sussex,
11–13 September 2019.
17 Note, however, that higher paying platforms are under-represented in our interviews.
18 But see Competition Commission South AfricaMarket Inquiry into Land Based Public Passenger Transport’
(http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/PROVISIONAL-REPORT-ON-E-HAILING-
AND-METERED-TAXIS-19February2020-NON-CONFIDENTIAL-VERSION1.pdf), para 7.5 for evi-
dence from 2018 that some Uber drivers were sometimes earning less than the minimum wage. Our evi-
dence was from 2019.
19 National Minimum Wage Act; Government Gazette No 11041 dated 17 February 2020.
20 https://www.globallivingwage.org/about/what-is-a-living-wage/; https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?
p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C131
21 R Heeks and others, A Living Wage for South African Platform Workers (Fairwork 2019). https://fair.work/
a-living-wage-for-south-african-platform-workers/
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Fair Conditions
This principle focuses on health and safety. Defining this for platform workers is
complex, since platforms generally transfer the cost of acquiring and maintaining a
‘workplace’ to the worker, whether it be in the form of a vehicle, bicycle, or computer
at the worker’s home. Principle 2 is therefore not bound to the notion of workplace.
Instead, for the first point, the platform should identify the task-specific risks that
arise for the worker and demonstrate that there are policies or practices in place that
protect workers from these risks. In South Africa, a major risk is from crime and
road accidents. Problems with clients were also identified in the fieldwork, as well as
dangerous pets and allergies for domestic workers.22 For the second point, platforms
should go beyond basic risk mitigation and take proactive measures to protect and
promote the health and safety of workers. This must be evidenced through a documen-
ted policy. Seven platforms were awarded the first point. SweepSouth and Uber received
an additional point for proactive measures, such as making available affordable health
insurance policies and an in-app panic button.
Fair Contracts
Access to a statement of terms and conditions of work is a key right for standard employ-
ees.23 For platform workers, simply accessing their terms of employment remains a
problem. Even more challenging is the fact that the digitally-mediated nature of the
work makes it very easy to change these terms. Workers report that they are regularly
presented with updated terms and conditions and are required to signify consent
before they can log on to start work. The conditions are long and complex, and given
the trade-off between working and spending time reading the terms, the choice is invari-
ably to simply agree.
To obtain the first point, therefore, the platform must show that terms and con-
ditions are transparent, concise, and provided to workers in an accessible form. Nine
platforms provided workers with continual access to their contract. Some, including
NoSweat and Picup, had made a particular effort to reduce overly complicated language.
For the other two—Bolt and Mr D, we could not find evidence that workers were able to
read their contracts after signing by tick-box.
The second point attempts to address the widespread misclassification of workers as
self-employed. To obtain this point, a platform must accurately characterize the nature
of the worker’s relationship, assessed using criteria taken from the South African defi-
nition of employee.24 Given the extent of contestation of this definition in courts, this
has been challenging to determine. Even more challenging are cases when the
22 Heeks et al, above n 15.
23 See e.g. UK Employment Rights Act 1996, s.1; SA Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1997, (BCEA) s33.
24 BCEA, s1.
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characterization as self-employed is accurate. To devise an alternative criterion for con-
tractual integrity, we decided to focus on the widespread practice by platforms of limit-
ing their own contractual liability by incorporating wide-ranging exemption clauses in
terms of service. For this, we drew from the principle of limiting unfair contract
terms in consumer contracts.25 Thus, where workers are genuinely self-employed, the
platform must evidence that terms of service are free of clauses which unreasonably
exclude platform liability.
All the workers interviewed were formally classified as self-employed. Yet the large
majority exhibited clear signs of employment. As many as 41 interviewees worked for
only one platform and were dependent on it economically. The workers were also
under a significant degree of control or direction from the platform, and it was easily
arguable that the app represented an important part of the ‘tools of the trade’ for the
purposes of the definition. This misclassification of the workers was reflected in the
fact that only two of the platforms was awarded the second point under the contract
principle.26 Nevertheless, of the 29 workers who responded, 16 preferred to be seen
as independent contractors. This could be because they conflate self-employed status
with the flexibility which they value, even if it is illusory in practice, or because they
have imbibed the rhetoric of the platform economy, and regard themselves as entrepre-
neurs. This reinforces the need to fashion decent work standards for all workers, regard-
less of classification.
Fair Management
Reflecting the need to capture fair procedures, the first point is awarded if there is evi-
dence of documented processes through which workers can be heard, appeal decisions
affecting them and be informed of the reasons for decisions. The platform interface must
feature a channel for workers to communicate with the platform and a process for
workers to appeal disciplinary decisions or deactivations. In the case of deactivations,
the appeals process must be available to workers who no longer have access to the plat-
form. Six platforms were awarded this first point. In relation to the other platforms,
some workers had experienced arbitrary deactivation, while others did not have access
to an appeals process through the platform interface. Some interviewees reported that
although channels of communication existed, platforms were slow to respond or
unresponsive.
The additional point under this heading concerns equity in the management
process. To achieve this point, there must be evidence that the platform is actively
25 UK Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.
26 GetTOD appeared to exercise no specific control over the manner of performance and did not use cus-
tomer reviews to deactivate or penalise workers, and NoSweat appeared genuinely limited to facilitating
contact and ensuring payment. This contrasts with the German study, which finds that many workers
are accurately classified as employees.
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seeking to prevent discrimination against workers from disadvantaged groups. In the
first year, this also included the right to be informed of data. Only four platforms
were awarded this point and all achieved it in relation to fair data collection.
For the second year, these results led us to consider how the criteria could be more
responsive to platform workers’ experience, particularly in relation to the use of algor-
ithms, the risk of discrimination by third party consumers and the high degree of gender
segregation. The revised ranking principle thus has five criteria. Firstly, there should be a
policy which guarantees that the platform will not discriminate against persons on the
grounds of race, gender, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, religion or
belief, age or any other status which is protected against discrimination in local law.27
The second criterion aims to address the particularly challenging issue of gender seg-
regation. There is a high degree of gender segregation among the platforms we assessed,
with the delivery and ride-hailing platforms being overwhelmingly male and the dom-
estic worker platforms overwhelmingly female. To respond to this, the second criterion
requires that, where there is significant under-representation of a disadvantaged group,
the platform should have a plan to identify and remove barriers to access by persons
from that group, resulting in improved representation. A good illustration is an
Indian food-delivery platform reported to have specifically attempted to recruit more
women.28 Having identified obstacles to recruitment of women as including the
dangers of the job, the absence of a women-friendly environment and the need for
specific training, it reportedly identified ‘safe zones’ for women to operate in and
allows them to complete their deliveries by 6 pm. In addition, it is putting in place a
dedicated helpline for any concerns, and appointing more women in managerial
roles. It claims to have hired 2000 women under this policy.
The third criterion requires the platform to do more than simply have a policy on
non-discrimination. It must also take practical measures to promote equality of oppor-
tunity for workers from disadvantaged groups, including reasonable accommodation for
pregnancy, disability, and religion or belief. We address algorithms in the fourth cri-
terion: if algorithms are used to determine access to work or remuneration, these
should be transparent and should not result in inequitable outcomes for workers
from historically or currently disadvantaged groups.
Addressing the risk of customer discrimination is challenging. The platform itself
cannot be held to be responsible for users’ discriminatory policies. Instead, according
to the fifth criterion, the platform must have mechanisms to reduce the risk of users dis-
criminating against any group of workers in accessing and carrying out work. A platform
could require users to sign up to its ethic of non-discrimination when they use the plat-
form; encourage workers to rate users, including in relation to non-discrimination; give
clear support to workers’ experiencing discrimination and, where possible, refuse to
27 SA Constitution, s.9; PEPUDA, ch.2.
28 https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/news/story/swiggy-will-hire-2000-women-as-food-delivery-
personnel-html-1388164-2018-11-14 accessed 20 October 2019.
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continue to supply services to users who have been discriminating against workers. For
example, in India, a food delivery platform reportedly refused to give a refund or provide
an alternative rider when a user objected to a receiving their order from a Muslim deliv-
ery rider.29
In the second year, three South African platforms achieved this point—SweepSouth,
Picup, and M4Jam. Picup was able to evidence initiatives to recruit more women cour-
iers, while M4Jam could show that equity was inherent to its ethos; the platform was set
up as a way to extend economic opportunities to disadvantaged communities, and has a
majority of black women workers.
Fair Representation
There are numerous obstacles to collective organization for platform workers. Not only
do workers often work alone; but they are frequently in competition with each other for
scarce work. Platforms can easily deactivate workers they regard as disruptive. Thus to
obtain the first fair representation point, there must be no evidence of freedom of associ-
ation being prevented by the platform, or of a refusal by the platform to communicate
with designated representatives of workers. Workers should not be subject to detriment
or discrimination for organizing and associating with one another. In addition, a docu-
mented process through which worker voice can be expressed should be evidenced. Six
platforms received the first point for fair representation.
The second point is more demanding. It requires the platform to publicly recognize
an independent, collective body of workers; as well as not having refused to participate in
collective representation or bargaining. Where such organizations do not exist, the plat-
form must sign a public statement of its willingness to recognize a collective body of
workers or trade union. None of the platforms recognized a union or any other collective
body, However, two formally indicated their willingness to engage with such a body.
One posted a statement to this effect on its website, and another encoded it in its con-
tract. While these efforts are encouraging, the overall absence of representation is par-
ticularly concerning. Without the ability for workers themselves to articulate, demand
and monitor decent work standards, other methods of implementation, both through
public rating and legal rights, will remain limited.
Interviews with workers revealed an even lower level of collective organization. The
nature of the work made an important difference. None of the NoSweat freelancers had
met up with others, either physically or within a chat group, a finding which is consistent
with the relative isolation of digital gig workers reported elsewhere.30 Domestic workers
were similarly isolated. They rarely had an opportunity to physically meet each other as a
group. Their WhatsApp groups were run by the platform, making it impossible to have
29 https://www.forbes.com/sites/meghabahree/2019/08/01/food-doesnt-have-a-religion-did-zomato-do-
the-right-thing/#284b13a148e5 accessed 20 October 2019.
30 Graham et al, above n 12.
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independent interaction. By contrast, delivery and taxi drivers have waiting areas where
they are able to congregate, and most were in chat-groups specific to their platform and
nationality. The content of interaction was more likely to be about everyday aspects of
the work outside the control of the platforms, such as warnings about traffic or police,
tips on good areas or times to get business or help with repairing cars or bikes. Of the
minority of interactions relating directly to work conditions, levels of payment domi-
nated. This reflected the foremost demand of platform workers for better pay. Official
collective representation was almost non-existent. However, we found some unconven-
tional examples of worker organization. A number of delivery drivers we talked to
belonged to a ‘stokvel’, or a self-run savings group where members make regular con-
tributions of a small amount to a shared account and the group decides how the
money is spent. In this case, the funds are paid out as compensation for loss of
income if one of the group is injured on the road. In some cases we heard funds had
gone towards supporting the families of drivers who had been killed.
One notable finding was the general view of interviewees on unions. In the first year,
only three out of 70 workers expressed an interest in joining a union, whereas in the
second year this was true for more than half the workers interviewed. This is a striking
increase and could indicate a growing consciousness of the potential of collective action
among platform workers.
PART IV: FROM RATING PRINCIPLES TO LEGALLY BINDING STANDARDS
To what extent then can the experience of rating principles be used to frame legally
binding standards? Only the beginnings of a response can be provided here. So far as
fair pay goes, there is already some precedent in the UK for including waiting hours
in determining minimum pay,31 and this should be generalized to platform workers.
Likewise, it has been accepted that time spent by workers who travel from one assign-
ment to the next during the day is counted as time when the minimum wage is
payable.32 Where the law does need to move beyond existing boundaries to accommo-
date platform workers is in recognizing that minimum pay should be calculated after
costs have been taken into account.
Similarly, health and safety protection requires adaptation of existing legal frame-
works configured around a conception of a place of work under the employer’s
control.33 A particularly helpful precedent is the ILO Violence and Harassment Conven-
tion 2019 (C190), which protects ‘workers and other persons in the world of work…
31 Uber BV v Aslam above n 15.
32 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy National Minimum Wage and National Living
Wage: Calculating the minimum wage (2019) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/835794/calculating-minimum-wage-guidance-april-2019.
pdf accessed 18 October 2019, p. 36.
33 See e.g. UK Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, s.2(2)(d).
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irrespective of their contractual status.’ Protection under the Convention extends not
only to the workplace, but to all places where workers take rest or meal breaks, work-
related trips, commuting to and from work and through work-related communications
(including ICT).
It is in the area of contract that there is particular scope for creative development to
address the specific concerns of platform workers. The ranking principles require plat-
forms to make the workers’ contract available, but do not specify the content. Legal pro-
visions should go further and set out what specific details the contract should contain.34
Furthermore, the platform should not just be named in the contract, but should be a
legal entity within the jurisdiction in which workers’ activities (e.g. driving) take
place. This would avoid claims by the platform to be based in a different jurisdiction
for the purposes of legal liability.35
Nor is it necessary to remain within the bounds of employment law. Contract law
has useful elements which could be drawn on to regulate the relationship between plat-
forms and platform workers. One example could be to extrapolate from consumer pro-
tection legislation, which regulates terms which are unfair or unreasonable.36 A further
well-recognized contractual principle is that of unconscionability. This principle was
directly relied on in Heller v Uber,37 where the Supreme Court of Canada held that an
arbitration clause requiring all disputes to be settled in the Netherlands was unconscion-
able. The doctrine of unconscionability permits a Court to strike down a contractual
clause where there is clear inequality of bargaining power, leading to a bargain which
unduly advantages the stronger party or unduly disadvantages the more vulnerable.
Both these criteria were fulfilled in this case. There was clearly inequality of bargaining
power: Heller, a food delivery worker in Toronto, was in no position to re-negotiate the
standard-form contract presented to him by Uber. Moreover, the arbitration clause
clearly unduly disadvantaged Heller, who could only resolve a dispute with Uber by
paying a large up-front administrative fee, amounting to almost his whole annual
income, leaving aside the cost of travel, accommodation, legal representation and lost
wages.38
In relation to fair management and non-discrimination, the role of algorithms is a
key challenge for future regulation. There should be at least a legal requirement that
workers be made aware of the criteria which are used and how they are used. From
the other direction, our fieldwork demonstrated clearly that reputational pressure is
not sufficient to be sure that internal processes might not be fully implemented. They
need to be backed up by the possibility of external enforcement through access to a
34 See UK Employment Relations Act 1996, s.1.
35 Contrast NUPSAW obo Mostert v Uber South Africa Technology Services (Pty) Ltd, Uber B.V. & Uber Inter-
national Holding B.V.WECT 18234-18, 31 May 2018 (South African Labour Court) and Uber BV v Aslam
above n 14 and see Fredman and du Toit, above n 14.
36 See e.g. the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act and the South African Consumer Protection Act.
37 Uber Technologies v Heller 2020 SCC 16 Supreme Court of Canada.
38 Ibid; paras 53ff.
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fair and accessible dispute resolution mechanism at no cost or at an affordable cost to the
worker.
Finally, so far as fair representation is concerned, much thought still needs to be
given to ways of facilitating collective representation, and protecting individuals
against victimization. This is one area where technology can be enabling.
PART V: CONCLUSION: COMPLEMENTARY PATHWAYS TO CHANGE
It is clear that we have had some positive impact in persuading platforms to change some
of their practices as a result of exposure to the rating principles. The rating principles are
also helpful in providing the basis for legal regulation of platform work which responds
to the specific needs and characteristics of this kind of work. It is now time to take the
next steps, to generalize these principles in the form of binding legal standards.
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